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Introduction
When Jon Arrieta at the start of his stay in Oxford in 2005 suggested a 
seminar on “Forms of Union in the British and Spanish Monarchies in the 
Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries”, I welcomed the idea enthusiasti-
cally, both because of it s historical importance and because of it s contempo-
rary relevance. If I may be allowed a personal reference, it is a subject that 
has been close to the centre of my interest s ever since I began researching 
in the 1950’s into the history of Habsburg Spain. My study of the origins of 
the revolt of the Catalans in 1640 against the policies of the government in 
Madrid headed by the Count-Duke of Olivares brought me face to face with a 
theme that is central to the history of modern Spain –the theme of the rela-
tionship between Castile, the dominant kingdom in the Spain created by the 
union of the Crowns of Castile and Aragon in the late fifteenth century, and 
the other kingdoms, regions and peoples of the Iberian peninsula. This theme 
of the fluctuating relationship between what I called –I think not very satis-
factorily– centre and periphery, was the guiding thread in my book, Imperial 
Spain, published in 1963. Ever since then it has continued to inform my 
thinking, not only about Spain it self, but also about the monarquía española, 
including Spain’s overseas empire in America. 
Among the British historians who read my The Revolt of the Catalans was 
the young Conrad Russell, who was then at an early stage of his researches 
into seventeenth-century British history. As he later told me, the reading of 
that book gave him insight s into the problem of absentee kingship and of the 
relationship between England, Scotland and Ireland, which he would go on to 
develop in his studies of what he called the British question and the origins 
of the English civil war, or, as it is now coming to be called, “the War of the 
Three Kingdoms”. We have come a long way since British history was largely 
English history, just as we have come a long way since Spanish history was 
largely the history of Castile.
This has had important implications for our general understanding of the 
development of European states, and the European state-system, in the six-
teenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The whole thrust of nineteenth 
and early twentieth-century European historiography was directed towards 
interpreting and vindicating the centralized nation-state as the logical, and 
desirable, culmination of a thousand years of European history. Alternative 
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forms of state organization, like Austria-Hungary, came to be regarded as 
political anachronisms, the unsustainable relics of a discredited past, and 
the break-up of Austria-Hungary at the end of the First World War seemed to 
confirm this judgment. 
But since the end of the Second World War there has been a marked 
change of attitude as new political forces have come into play across the 
continent. Attempt s to build a European community have led to a diminution 
of the sovereignty of the nation-state in favour of a supra-national organiza-
tion with echoes of the empire of Charles V, who was born, if not in Brussels, 
at least in Ghent. At the same time the centralized nation-state has come 
under pressure from below, as well as from above. On the one hand we have 
seen the resurgence of national and ethnic groups which, for one reason or 
another, either failed to achieve the status of independent statehood during 
the preceding centuries or, alternatively (like Scotland), lost it. On the other 
we have seen the resurgence of regions, anxious to secure a greater degree 
of control over their own lives by loosening the ties that bind them too tightly 
to central government. The effect of this realignment of political, national and 
regional forces in contemporary Europe has been to revive interest in those 
alternative forms of political organization which, until as recently as half a 
century ago, seemed to have been relegated to the scrapheap of history.
This process of rethinking and reshaping the international structure of 
Europe and the internal structure of the European state has gone hand in 
hand with the rethinking by historians of the earlier history of European state-
formation. To some extent at least the processes of rethinking by politicians 
on the one hand and historians on the other have interacted, in the sense 
that historians have been alive to the political movement s at work in contem-
porary Europe, while politicians –or so I would like to think– have picked up 
ideas that are floating in the historical air. Work by historians of Spain, Italy 
and the Netherlands on the monarquía española of the Spanish Habsburgs, 
by historians of central Europe on the Austrian Empire, and by British his-
torians on development s in the British Isles between the sixteenth and the 
eighteenth centuries, has helped to accustom us to the idea of what I called, 
in an article published in Past and Present in 1992, “A Europe of Composite 
Monarchies”1.
Whatever term we choose –“composite monarchies”, “multiple king-
doms”, “dynastic agglomerates”2–, we now have a pretty good idea of what 
it involves. We are looking at political entities in which two or more polities 
have been brought together in some form of association or merger. The 
1. ELLIOTT, J. H. “A Europe of Composite Monarchies”, In: Past and Present, 187 (1992); pp. 
48-71. Reprinted In: ELLIOTT, J. H. Spain, Europe and the Wider World, 1500-1800, New Haven 
and London: 2009), ch. 1.
2. The term suggested by John Morrill in his Stenton Lecture for 2005, “‘Uneasy Lies the 
Head that Wears a Crown’. Dynastic Crises in Tudor and Stewart Britain, 1504-1746” (University 
of Reading, 2005); p. 11.
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seventeenth-century Spanish jurist, Juan de Solórzano Pereira, identified 
two ways in which a newly acquired territory might be united to the mon-
arch’s other dominions. One of these was what he called “accessory union”, 
whereby a kingdom or province, on being united with another, was regarded 
as juridically part of it, with it s inhabitant s possessing the same right s, and 
subject to the same laws. This form of union might come about in particular 
as a consequence of conquest, as it did, for instance, with the American ter-
ritories which fell to the conquistadores, and were juridically incorporated into 
the Crown of Castile. But the more common form of union in the Early Modern 
period was what Solórzano Pereira called union “aeque principaliter”, in which 
the constituent kingdoms were brought together through marriage or dynas-
tic inheritance, and each of them, although henceforth ruled by the same 
monarch, retained it s own laws and institutions. This applied to most of the 
kingdoms and provinces that came to form part of the monarquía española, 
even if, as with Navarre or Naples, they might technically be regarded as 
conquered territories. It is worth noting, incidentally, that, under the terms 
of the marriage settlement, if a child had been born of the marriage of Philip 
II to Mary Tudor and succeeded to the joint thrones of England and Spain, 
sixteenth-century England, united to Castile “aeque principaliter”, would have 
preserved it s own laws and institutions. 
I suspect that Solórzano Pereira’s distinction between his two forms 
of union –accessory union and union on an equal footing, or “aeque princi-
paliter”– is too clear-cut to cover the complexities of political union in Early 
Modern Europe. The “incorporating union” of England and Scotland in 1707, 
for instance, seems to fall neatly into neither category, since, while the Scot s 
lost their parliament, they preserved their church and their legal system. 
But, as John Robert son says in his contribution to this volume, the “rigidity 
of the choice facing the Scot s was also a reflection of a wider inflexibility in 
European thinking about forms of union.” As he tells us, it was difficult to 
conceive of a union in which there were inequalities of power, a genuinely 
federal union, rather than one that was either confederal or incorporating. 
It is clearly necessary for us to be alive to the concept s of a period, as 
also to the vocabulary in which they were expressed, as Pablo Fernández 
Albaladejo demonstrates in discussing the vocabulary available to the Count-
Duke of Olivares when he attempted to introduce his ideas for the govern-
ment of Spain. It is clear that the novelty of his project s was out of step with 
the traditional language in which he had to formulate them. This in turn raises 
the question as to whether there were significant national variant s. For the 
Scot s, the word “province” suggested dependency. For seventeenth-century 
Catalans, on the other hand, it seems to have been a neutral term which they 
could use of the Principality without implying any form of subordination3.
3. For the use of the word provincia in seventeenth-century Catalonia, see TORRES SANS, 
Xavier. Naciones sin nacionalismo. Cataluña en la monarquía hispánica (siglos XVI-XVII), Valencia, 
2008; pp. 114-121.
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It is, however, necessary to range more widely than the technicalities of 
union, however fascinating these may be from both a historical and a juridical 
standpoint. We need to consider how unions operated in practice, and how 
they changed over time. At some moment s, unions appear to function well; 
at other moment s not so well. Why should this be, and what makes a union 
work? How, in other words, do –and should– composite states operate, and 
to what extent do they call for a different kind of politics from the politics of a 
centralized state?
What is clear is that juridical forms are not in themselves sufficient to 
ensure a union’s success. The contributions to this volume demonstrate 
the need to pay attention to topics that aroused contemporary sensitivities, 
such as the name to be given to the new collective entity, the language to 
be employed in it s administration, and the nature and degree of integra-
tion, including psychological and economic integration, that was sought and 
achieved. These topics will not be easy to handle, but they deserve more sys-
tematic treatment than they have so far received. 
As regards nomenclature, for example, in 1603 James VI and I wanted to 
impose the name of “Great Britain” on the collectivity of his territories. While 
this was relatively acceptable to the Scot s, it displeased the English, who, as 
Jenny Wormald tells us, were afraid that “England” would be marginalized. 
The English solved the problem to their own satisfaction by using “England” 
and “Britain” interchangeably, and tended to speak of Scotland and Wales as 
if they formed part of England. Castilians similarly tended to identify Castile 
with Spain, in spite of the protest s of the other Iberian peoples.
Where language is concerned, this did not have the importance in the 
early modern period that it would possess from the early nineteenth century 
onwards, with the advent of Romanticism. But in some instances, as in sev-
enteenth-century Catalonia, the question of the language used by the royal 
administration could prove to be highly sensitive. Equally, however, language 
could be a useful weapon of defence against the dominant power. According 
to a recent article on seventeenth-century Flanders, when Madrid attempted 
to appoint a Spaniard to the Council of Finance in Brussels, the influential 
royal councillor Pierre Roose replied as follows: 
To achieve the desired effect, the Spaniard who is to join the Council 
and inform His Majesty of the financial situation would need to know the 
French language very well. Alternatively, His Majesty would have to order that 
Castilian should be the spoken and written language for Council business, 
and that all document s authorizing the collection and distribution of money 
should be drafted in the same language. The first would be difficult, the second 
impossible4. 
4. VERMEIR, René. “Les limites de la monarchie composée. Pierre Roose, factotum du comte-
duc d’Olivares aux Pays-Bas espagnols”, In: XVIIe Siècle, 240 (2008); pp. 495-518, at p. 508.
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As for integration, religious differences in Great Britain obviously pre-
sented serious obstacles to the union of the different kingdoms, whereas in 
Spain this problem did not arise. The differences between the Anglican and 
Scottish forms of Protestantism played an important part in the outbreak of 
the Civil War, as also in the attempt s to achieve a more perfect union, while 
the conflict between a Protestant England and a Roman Catholic Ireland dis-
astrously affected the relationship between the two countries over the course 
of more than four centuries.
While the religious question was an exclusively British problem, economic 
integration, on the other hand, created enormous difficulties both in the 
Iberian peninsula and in the British Isles. Readers of this volume will quickly 
become aware of the great importance of customs barriers as obstacles to 
union; and Jesús Astigarraga’s account of the impact of the barriers on the 
politics of the Basque provinces well into the nineteenth century can only 
enhance admiration for the skill of the delegates who negotiated the Anglo-
Scottish union in 1707 in constructing out of the two countries a single com-
mercial and industrial entity.
Finally, as Pablo Fernández Albaladejo and Jenny Wormald demonstrate, 
much remains to be said about the challenge facing the partisans of a looser 
union in attempting to overcome the kind of ethnic and national differences 
that seemed to stand in the way of a union of heart s and minds. Here a fas-
cinating comparison could be made between the policies adopted by James I 
and those of the Count-Duke of Olivares. Both of them were very conscious of 
the challenge, and anxious to overcome it as far as possible, but while James 
I quickly came to appreciate the impossibility of realizing his ambition in the 
near future and adjusted his policies to the realities of the situation, the 
Count-Duke persisted with his schemes to the point of leading his country to 
disaster. Was James a more prudent and agile politician than Olivares, or is 
it simply that the pressures of war left the Count-Duke with no other option? 
These are questions of more than purely antiquarian interest. Indeed, 
they possess a direct contemporary relevance. In the opening years of the 
eighteenth century, the constitutional structures of Britain and Spain under-
went major upheavals. The Anglo-Scottish union of 1707, replacing the dynas-
tic union of 1603 brought about by the accession of James VI of Scotland to 
the English throne, meant a radical change in the constitutional structure of 
Great Britain. It produced new and significant asymmetries between the dif-
ferent part s of a British composite monarchy that was transformed by the 
Glorious Revolution of 1688 into an entirely new historical phenomenon, a 
composite parliamentary monarchy. 
These asymmetries are understandable if one thinks of the different ways 
in which the territories subject to the British crown had been united. The princi-
pality of Wales had effectively been assimilated into England in 1536 under a 
form of accessory union. Ireland, elevated to the status of a kingdom in 1541, 
preserved it s own parliament, but was effectively an English conquest, and 
was treated as such. Scotland lost it s parliament in 1707, but was otherwise 
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treated, in theory if not necessarily in practice, as having been united ‘aeque 
principaliter’. When the House of Hanover ascended to the British throne 
in 1714, George I, as King of Great Britain, continued to be the Elector of 
Hanover, and the electorate, which formed part of the Holy Roman Empire, pre-
served it s traditional institutions. In due course the ministers of George I and 
George II would learn how to manipulate one or other of the king’s two titles to 
advance the foreign policy objectives they wished to pursue5. As for the British 
colonies in North America, each of which had it s own representative assembly, 
the uncertainties surrounding their constitutional status were to have momen-
tous consequences in the second half of the eighteenth century.
These constiutional asymmetries between the territories ruled by eight-
eenth-century British monarchs created opportunities but also signalled 
dangers, both for the government and for the territories themselves. By con-
trast, in the Spanish Monarchy the Bourbon dynasty which succeeded the 
Habsburgs on the throne in 1700 introduced drastic constitutional changes 
between 1707 and 1716. The Nueva Planta abolished the traditional laws, 
liberties and institutions of the territories of the Crown of Aragon –the king-
doms of Aragon and Valencia, and the principality of Catalonia– and sub-
jected them directly to the central government in Madrid. In the formulation 
of Ricardo García Cárcel, the ‘horizontal Spain’ of the House of Austria was 
replaced by the ‘vertical Spain’ of the Bourbons6. But even the vertical, cen-
tralized and absolutist Spain of the Bourbons was not a completely unitary 
state. The Catalans retained their civil law and their local usages, while the 
Basque provinces and Navarre, which had been willing to accept the new 
dynasty, preserved a separate status that survived without major change until 
1876.
In Spain, following the Napoleonic invasion of 1808, and the loss of the 
greater part of it s American empire, the Bourbon unitary state was subjected 
to growing strains and tensions. The Spanish Civil War can be seen, from 
one point of view, as the culmination of the long struggle between horizontal 
and vertical Spain that began with the imposition of the Nueva Planta over 
two centuries earlier. The Franco regime restored vertical Spain, but with the 
transition to democracy and a constitutional monarchy following the death of 
Franco and the new constitution of 1978, horizontal Spain has once again 
moved into the ascendant. In Britain, the strains and tensions came later 
–first with the Irish uprising and the creation of an independent Irish republic 
in the 1920’s, and then more recently– again following the loss of overseas 
empire –in the upsurge of Scottish and Welsh nationalism. In both instances 
I believe that there is a direct relation between the loss of empire and the 
resurgence of nationalist sentiment s at home. 
5. See the discussion of the British-Hanoverian connection and it s foreign policy implications 
in SIMMS, Brendan. Three Victories and a Defeat. The Rise and Fall of the First British Empire, Lon-
don, 2008; especially pp. 90-92, and 295.
6. GARCÍA CÁRCEL, Ricardo. Felipe V y los españoles. Una visión periférica del problema de 
España, Barcelona, 2002; pp. 114-124.
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 Spain with it s 1978 constitution, and Britain with it s moves in the direc-
tion of devolution, have therefore both been faced in recent years with the 
problem of how to work out new and effective forms of union appropriate for 
a new era. Both countries are aware of the need to rethink the inheritance 
of the past, looking at what deserves to be salvaged, and what can be jet-
tisoned. Historians have a vital part to play in this process of rethinking, and, 
if they do their work well, might even manage to convince today’s dangerously 
a-historical politicians that they can learn something from the past. The prob-
lems of living together, of what Spaniards call convivencia, are the problems 
of every age, and remain crucial to our survival. Let us hope that the past can 
provide us with some guidance.
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